Computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in general two-player Bayesian games (not to be confused with Stackelberg strategies in routing games) is a topic that has recently been gaining attention, due to their application in various security and law enforcement scenarios. Earlier results consider the computation of optimal Stackelberg strategies, given that all the payoffs and the prior distribution over types are known. We extend these results in two different ways. First, we consider learning optimal Stackelberg strategies. Our results here are mostly positive. Second, we consider computing approximately optimal Stackelberg strategies. Our results here are mostly negative.
Introduction
Game theory defines solution concepts for strategic situations, in which multiple selfinterested agents interact in the same environment. Perhaps the best-known solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium [11] . A Nash equilibrium prescribes a strategy for every player, in such a way that no individual player has an incentive to change her strategy. If strategies are allowed to be mixed-a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies-then it is known that every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium. Some games have more than one equilibrium, leading to the equilibrium selection problem.
Perhaps the most basic representation of a game is the normal form. In the normalform representation, every player's pure strategies are explicitly listed, and for every combination of pure strategies, every player's utility is explicitly listed.
The problem of computing Nash equilibria of a normal-form game has received a large amount of attention in recent years. Finding a Nash equilibrium is PPADcomplete [6, 1] . Finding an optimal equilibrium (for just about any reasonable definition of "optimal"-for instance, maximizing the sum of the players' utilities) is NP-hard [7, 3] ; moreover, it is not even possible to find an equilibrium that is approximately optimal in polynomial time, unless P=NP [3] . This holds even for two-player games.
However, Nash equilibrium is not always the right solution concept. In some settings, one player can credibly commit to a strategy, and communicate this to the other player, before the other player can make a decision. To see how this can affect the outcome of a game, consider the following simple normal-form game (which has previously been used as an example for this, e.g., [2] ): L R U (2,1) (4,0) D (1,0) (3,1)
Fig. 1. A sample game and its extensive form representation
For the case where the players move simultaneously (no ability to commit), the unique Nash equilibrium is (U, L): U strictly dominates D, so that the game is solvable by iterated strict dominance. So, player 1 (the row player) receives utility 2. However, now suppose that player 1 has the ability to commit. Then, she is better off committing to play D, which will incentivize player 2 to play R, resulting in a utility of 3 for player 1. The situation gets even better for player 1 if she can commit to a mixed strategy: in this case, she can commit to the mixed strategy (.5 − , .5 + ), which still incentivizes player 2 to play R, but now player 1 receives an expected utility of 3.5 − . To ensure the existence of optimal strategies, we assume (as is commonly done [2, 12] ) that player 2 breaks ties in player 1's favor, so that the optimal strategy for player 1 to commit to is (.5, .5), resulting in a utility of 3.5. (Note that there is never a reason for player 2 to randomize, since he effectively faces a single-agent decision problem.) An optimal strategy to commit to is usually called a Stackelberg strategy, after von Stackelberg, who showed that in Cournot's duopoly model [4] , a firm that can commit to a production quantity has a strategic advantage [15] . Throughout this paper, a Stackelberg strategy is an optimal mixed strategy to commit to; we will only consider two-player games. In this context, the Stackelberg leader's expected utility is always at least the expected utility that she would receive in any Nash (or even correlated) equilibrium of the simultaneousmove game [16] . In contrast, committing to a pure strategy is not always beneficial; for example, consider matching pennies.
One may argue that the normal form is not the correct representation for this game. In game theory, the time structure of games is usually represented by the extensive form. Indeed, the above game can be represented as the extensive-form game in Figure 1 . While this is a conceptually useful representation, from a computational perspective it is not helpful: player 1 has an infinite number of strategies, hence (the naïve representation of) the tree has infinite size. It should be emphasized that committing to a mixed strategy is not the same as randomizing over which pure strategy to commit to; in fact, there is no reason to randomize over which strategy to commit to. Thus, from a computational viewpoint, it makes more sense to operate directly on the normal form.
The problem of computing Stackelberg strategies in general normal-form (or, more generally, Bayesian) games has only recently started to receive attention. A 2006 EC paper by Conitzer and Sandholm [2] layed out the basic complexity results for this setting: Stackelberg strategies can be computed in polynomial time for two-player general-sum normal-form games using linear programming (in contrast to the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium), but computing Stackelberg strategies is NP-hard for two-player Bayesian games or three-player normal-form games. Undeterred by the NP-hardness result, Paruchuri et al. [12] developed a mixed-integer program for finding an (optimal) Stackelberg strategy in the two-player Bayesian case (the setting that we study in this paper). They show that using this formulation is much faster than converting the game to normal form (leading to an exponential increase in size) and then using the linear programming approach. Moreover, this algorithm forms the basis for their deployed ARMOR system, which is used at the Los Angeles International Airport to randomly place checkpoints on roads entering the airport, as well as to decide on canine patrol routes [9, 13] . The use of commitment in similar games dates back much further, including, for example, applications to inspection games [10] . The formal properties of various types of commitment are also studied in [8] .
It should be noted that Stackelberg strategies are a generalization of minimax strategies in two-player zero-sum games. Because computing minimax strategies is equivalent to linear programming [5] , this also implies that a linear programming solution for computing Stackelberg strategies is the best that we can hope for. Of course, Nash equilibrium is an alternative generalization of minimax strategies. Stackelberg strategies have the significant advantage that they avoid the equilibrium selection problem: there is an optimal value of the game for the leader (player 1), which in general corresponds to a single optimal strategy (though not in degenerate cases). The notion of "Stackelberg strategies" has appeared in other contexts in the algorithmic game theory literature, specifically, in the context of routing games, where a single benevolent party controls part of the flow, and commits to routing this flow in a manner that minimizes total latency [14] . While interesting, that paper does not seem that closely related to our work, because in our context, the leader is a selfish player in an arbitrary game.
The rest of this paper is layed out as follows. In Section 2, we formally review the necessary concepts, introduce our notation, and discuss existing results that are relevant. In Section 3-the first half of our contribution-we prove several results about learning Stackelberg strategies, in contexts where the follower payoffs and/or the distribution over types is not known initially. In Section 4-the second half of our contributionwe consider purely computational problems and give (in)approximability results.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review notation and existing results.
Notation and definitions
We will refer to player 1 as the leader and to player 2 as the follower. Let A l be the set of leader actions in the game (|A l | = d), and let A f be the set of follower actions (|A f | = k). The leader's utility is given by a function u l : A l × A f → R. When we are studying approximability, we (wlog) require all the leader utilities to be nonnegative (to make multiplicative approximation meaningful). In a Bayesian game, the follower has a set of types Θ (|Θ| = τ ), which, together with the actions taken, determine his utility, according to a function u f : Θ × A l × A f → R. For simplicity, we will not consider situations where the leader's utility also depends on the follower's type; this restriction strengthens our hardness results. We will refer to these as Bayesian games; a normal-form game is the special case where there is only a single type.
σ denotes a mixed strategy for the leader, and σ(a l ) the probability that σ places on action a l . Let BR(θ, σ) ∈ A f denote the action that the follower plays (that is, his best response, with ties broken in favor of the leader) when his type is θ and the leader has committed to playing σ. We note that BR(θ, σ) ∈ arg max
The BR function also captures the fact that the follower breaks ties in the leader's favor. Given the follower type θ, the leader's expected utility is
Given a prior probability distribution P : Θ → [0, 1] over follower types, the leader's expected utility for committing to σ is
When we take a worst-case perspective, we will be interested in a setting with types but without a prior distribution over them (also known as a pre-Bayesian game).
Known results and techniques
In this subsection we review the most relevant prior work. For a normal-form game, the optimal mixed leader strategy can be computed in polynomial time, as follows:
1 for every follower action a f , the following linear program (whose variables are the σ(a l )) can be used to determine the best leader strategy that makes the follower play a f :
Some of these linear programs may be infeasible (it is impossible to make a follower play a strictly dominated strategy), but some will be feasible; the solution of the one with the highest objective value gives the optimal mixed strategy for the leader.
For Bayesian games (with a prior), the problem of computing the optimal mixed leader strategy is known to be NP-hard [2] . However, this strategy can be found using a mixed integer program [12] .
Visualization
In this subsection, we show how the problems we discussed above can be visualized. Let us consider the normal-form case. The space of possible strategies for the leader defines a unit simplex in d − 1 dimensions, where d is the number of leader actions. For each strategy of the leader, the follower has a best response. The space of leader strategies for which the follower's best response is a f defines a (possibly empty) polyhedron. Therefore, the d-simplex splits into at most k (number of follower actions) polyhedral regions, based on the follower utility function. Each of these regions corresponds to the feasible region of one of the linear programs, and the objective of that linear program can be represented as an arrow in the region.
Let us consider the following small example and its visualization.
Fig. 2. A small game and its visualization
Each dot in Figure 2 represents the optimal point (leader mixed strategy) within each region (which lie on separating hyperplanes or on the boundary); the largest dot (.5,.5,0) shows the optimal point overall.
The Bayesian case can be visualized in (at least) two different ways. A simple way is to have a separate unit simplex for every type; this does not require a prior distribution over types (that is, it works for pre-Bayesian games). If there is a prior distribution over types, another way is to have a region for each element of the set of all pure strategies for the follower, so that (a f , etc. The arrows in this region represent the objective, which depends on the prior. This representation does not work for preBayesian games where we take a worst-case perspective, because the optimal point may be in the interior of a region.
Learning Stackelberg strategies
If a game is repeated over time, this opens up the possibility for the leader to learn something about the follower's utilities or the distribution over types. To avoid the possibility that the follower tries to mislead the leader over time, we imagine that a new follower agent is drawn in every round. Alternatively, the follower can be assumed to behave myopically. In a round, the leader commits to a mixed strategy, and subsequently observes the follower's response. The leader's goal is to learn enough to determine the optimal Stackelberg strategy, in as few rounds (samples) as possible.
Due to space constraint, we focus on the case with a single type: that is, in each round, the follower has the same payoff matrix, given by u f (a l , a f ), initially unknown to the leader. In each round, the leader commits to a mixed strategy σ and learns the follower's response. We say that the leader queries or samples the point σ on the probability simplex. The goal is to minimize the number of samples necessary to find the optimal (Stackelberg) mixed strategy for the leader. In Appendices B and C we consider two other cases with more than one type, one where the leader needs to learn the follower payoff function, and one where this function is known, but the leader must discover the distribution over types. We make the following assumptions:
-The follower utilities are non-degenerate; no separating hyperplanes coincide. -We will only consider regions whose volume is at least some fraction > 0 of the total volume, and try to find the optimal solution among points in these regions. (It can be argued that solutions in smaller regions are too unstable. Alternatively, we can simply assume that every nonempty region has at least this volume.) -We assume that the optimal solution can be specified exactly using a limited amount of precision quantified by L. This allows us to bound the number of iterations of binary search needed to calculate these hyperplanes exactly, to a linear multiple of L.
Our approach will be to learn all the regions (whose volume is at least of the total)-that is, find all hyperplanes separating these regions. Once we know these, the optimal strategy can be computed using the linear programming approach above.
A high-level outline of our algorithm SU is as follows. For each follower action a f ∈ A f , the algorithm maintains an overestimate P a f of the region where a f is a best response. It then refines these overestimates via sampling, until they are disjoint. SU 1. For each a f ∈ A f , find a point (leader strategy) q a f in the d-simplex to which a f is a best response (provided the corresponding region is sufficiently large). 2. Initially, each P a f is the entire d-simplex. 3. Repeat the following until all P a f are disjoint:
(a) Find a point p * in the intersection of some P a f and P a f .
(b) Sample to obtain the optimal follower strategy at p * ; call it a * f . (c) Draw a line segment between p * and some q a f for a f = a * f , a f ∈ {a f , a f }; perform binary search on this line to find a single point on a hyperplane that we have not yet discovered. (d) Find a set of d linearly independent points on the hyperplane, and hence reconstruct it. (e) Update the P a f to take this new hyperplane into account.
We now describe the steps of SU in detail.
Step (1). Finding a point in each region (with at least of the volume) can be achieved via random sampling, via the following lemma. Proof. The probability that a randomly chosen point corresponds to follower action a f is at least . Therefore, for any constant integer c ≥ 1, after ((c + 1)F log k) samples, the probability that follower action a f is not hit is at most (
c+1 . By a union bound, the probability that at least one action is not hit is at most ( Step (3 a-c). Consider two overestimates P a f and P a f that have nonzero overlap volume. By
Step (1), we may assume that we have sampled a point q a f that led to a response of a f (that is, q a f is in the region corresponding to a f ), and a point q a f that led to a response of a f . Both of these overestimates are characterized by sets H and H of hyperplanes that we have previously discovered. We need to discover a new hyperplane. It will not suffice to do binary search on the line segment between the two starting points, as illustrated by Figure 3 , which illustrates a situation where we have discovered two of the hyperplanes of Figure 2 . If we do binary search on the line segment between the two indicated points, we cannot discover the missing hyperplane, because the top region "gets in the way" (another action, namely C, will start being the best response). However, if we sample from the shaded set P L ∩ P R , the result will be different from one of the two points; then, by performing binary search on the line segment between this point and the new point, we will find a point on a new hyperplane. The following algorithm formalizes this idea. In it, we do not assume that the two overestimates overlap. FIND POINT 1. Solve a linear program to find an interior point p * of P a f ∩ P a f given the con- The detailed proof is in Appendix A.
Step (3d). In this step, the input is a point p on the hyperplane that we need to reconstruct, and the two follower actions a f and a f that correspond to the regions separated by this hyperplane. The following DETERMINE HYPERPLANE finds the hyperplane.
DETERMINE HYPERPLANE
1. Sample the vertices of a regular d-simplex with sides of length , centered at p. (Draw this simplex uniformly at random among such simplices.) 2. Organize the vertices of this simplex into two sets, V and V according to the region they fall in. (Both of these sets will be nonempty.) 3. Choose d distinct pairs of points where one of the points is in V and the other is in V 4. Binary-search the d line segments formed by these pairs, to find the points where these line segments intersect the hyperplane.
Lemma 3. DETERMINE HYPERPLANE will give d linearly independent points on the hyperplane using O(dL) samples.
Proof. First, consider the d + 1 vertices of the d-simplex centered at p. Since is sufficiently small, all of the points fall into one of the two regions (and since the simplex is chosen at random, there is zero probability of one of the vertices being exactly on the hyperplane). Since the hyperplane goes through p, at least one of the vertices of the simplex will fall into each region. As a result, there are at least d line segments between vertices of the simplex where the two vertices of the segment produce different follower actions. Finally, the points where the hyperplane intersects with these line segments must be linearly independent; otherwise, the simplex would not be full-dimensional. Furthermore, the number of samples needed to find the hyperplane-intersecting point on a line segment via binary search is linear in L. This completes the proof.
With these tools, we can give our main result for this problem: Details of the proof are in Appendix A. Once we have generated all the hyperplanes that separate regions, we can use the known linear programming approach described in Subsection 2.2 to find the optimal mixed strategy to commit to.
Theorem 1. To find, w.h.p., all the hyperplanes that separate regions, SU requires
O(F k log k + dk 2 L)) samples,
Computing Stackelberg strategies
In this section, we consider how different modeling assumptions affect the computational tractability and approximability of the Stackelberg problem with multiple follower types. Unlike the previous section, this section does not consider learning problems at all: it focuses strictly on the computational aspects of the optimization. Because of this, we only consider a single-round setting in this section.
The following aspects of the model will remain the same throughout this section.
-We consider two-player, general-sum games that have more than one follower type. -The leader's utility does not depend directly on the follower's type (but it does depend on the follower's action, which can be affected by the follower's type). -The follower's utility function u f (θ, a l , a f ) is common knowledge.
We consider two modeling decisions. The first decision concerns whether the type space is discrete or continuous. For the discrete case, we assume that we have a finite number of types, which are explicitly listed. For the continuous case, we assume that the space of possible types is defined by a lower bound and an upper bound for the follower's utility for each action profile (a l , a f ); every follower payoff matrix that is consistent with these bounds corresponds to some type.
The second modeling decision is whether the follower type is chosen according to a Bayesian model or an adversarial (worst-case) model. Note that the "adversary" is not one of the players of the game, in particular, the adversary and the follower are different.
Computing Bayesian optimal strategies with finitely many types
In this subsection we study how to compute the optimal mixed strategy when the follower's type is drawn from a known distribution over finitely many types. We refer to this problem as Bayesian optimization for finite types (BOFT). BOFT is defined as:
-We have a set Θ of possible follower types, |Θ| = τ . -The follower's utility function u f (θ, a l , a f ) is common knowledge.
-Both the follower's utility function u f (θ, a l , a f ) and the leader's utility function u f (θ, a l , a f ) are normalized to lie in [0,1] for all inputs. -The prior over follower types P (θ) is common knowledge. -An optimal leader strategy is one that maximizes the leader's expected utility.
This problem was first studied in [2] , where it was shown to be NP-hard. It also forms the basis for much of the applied work on computing Stackelberg strategies [9] . However, to the best of our knowledge, the approximability of this problem has not yet been studied. We settle the approximability precisely in this subsection.
Theorem 2. For all constant > 0, no polynomial-time factor-τ 1− approximation exists for BOFT unless NP = P, even if there are only two follower actions.
This hardness of approximation can be shown by a reduction from MAX-INDEPENDENT-SET. In this reduction, vertices correspond to types, and the leader cannot incentivize two adjacent types to both play a desirable action. The full reduction appears in Appendix D.
Theorem 3. There is a polynomial-time factor-τ approximation algorithm for BOFT.
A simple algorithm that achieves this is the following: choose a type uniformly at random, and solve for the optimal mixed strategy to commit to for this specific type (using the linear programming approach). With probability 1/τ , we choose the type that is actually realized, in which case we perform at least as well as the optimal overall strategy. Hence, this guarantees at least a τ approximation. Details and derandomization appear in Appendix D.
Computing worst-case optimal strategies with finitely many types
A prior distribution over follower types is not always readily available. In that case, we may wish to optimize for the worst-case type (equivalently, the worst-case distribution over types). We note that the worst-case type depends on the mixed strategy that we choose, so that this is not the same problem as optimizing against a single type. We refer to this problem as worst-case optimization for finite types (WOFT):
-We have a set Θ of possible follower types, |Θ| = τ .
-The follower's utility function u f (θ, a l , a f ) is common knowledge.
-An optimal leader strategy is one that maximizes the worst-case expected utility for the leader, where the worst case is taken over follower types (but we are taking the expectation over the mixed strategy). That is, an adversary (not equal to the follower) chooses the follower type after the leader mixed strategy is chosen, but before the pure-strategy realization. It turns out that WOFT is even less approximable than BOFT.
Theorem 4. WOFT is completely inapproximable in polynomial time, unless P=NP (that is, it is hard to distinguish between instances where the leader can get at least 1 in the worst case, and instances where the leader can only get 0)-even if there are only four follower actions.
This can be shown by a reduction from 3-SAT. In the resulting game, the leader can obtain an expected utility of 1 against every type if the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable, and otherwise will obtain utility 0 against some type. The full reduction appears in Appendix D.
Optimizing for the worst type with ranges
So far, we have assumed that the space of possible types is represented by explicitly listing the (finitely many) types and the corresponding utilities. However, this representation of the uncertainty that the leader has over the follower's preferences is not always convenient. For example, the leader may have a rough idea of every follower payoff, which could be represented by a range in which that payoff must lie. This corresponds to a continuous type space for the follower: every setting of all the follower payoffs within the ranges corresponds to a type.
In this subsection, we study the problem of maximizing the leader's worst-case utility over all types (instantiations of the follower payoffs within the ranges). Later in the subsection, we also consider a generalization where the follower payoffs in different entries can be linked to each other.
For example, consider the following game with ranges:
The leader is unsure about the follower's utility for (U, L) and (D, R), each of which is known to lie somewhere in the range [1, 2] (they can vary independently). The follower knows his utilities. If the leader places less than 1/3 probability on U , then the follower is guaranteed to play R; this results in a utility of at most 1/3 for the leader. If the leader places more than 2/3 probability on U , then the follower is guaranteed to play L; this results in a utility of at most 1/3 for the leader. If the leader places probability between 1/3 and 2/3 on U , then the follower may end up playing either L or R; by placing probability 1/2 on U , the leader obtains an expected utility of 1/2, which is optimal.
We refer to this problem as worst-case optimization for range types (WORT):
-For every (a l , a f ), the leader has a range in which the follower utility might lie,
The leader knows her own utilities u l (a l , a f ). -An optimal leader strategy is one that maximizes the worst-case expected utility for the leader, where the worst-case values of
Theorem 5. WORT is NP-hard.
This follows from a reduction from 3-COVER, which is presented in Appendix D.
It is an open question whether WORT can be efficiently approximated. In Appendix E, we define a generalization of WORT, which we prove is inapproximable unless P = N P . This generalization allows the follower's payoffs to be linked across entries.
Conclusion
Computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in general two-player Bayesian games is a topic that has been gaining attention in recent years, due to their application in both security and law enforcement. Earlier results consider the computation of optimal Stackelberg strategies, given that all the payoffs and the prior distribution over types are known. We extended these results in two ways. First, we considered learning optimal Stackelberg strategies. We first considered the normal-form case where the follower payoffs are not known and showed how we can efficiently learn enough about the payoffs to determine the optimal strategy. We then extended this to Bayesian games. We also considered the case where the payoffs are known, but the distribution over types is not. We showed how we can efficiently learn enough about the distribution to determine the optimal strategy. It must be admitted that it is debatable whether this framework for learning is practical for current real-world security applications, since the costs incurred during the learning phase may be too high; however, these costs may be more manageable in electronic commerce applications.
Second, we considered computing approximately optimal Stackelberg strategies. Our results here were mostly negative: we showed that the best possible approximation ratio that can be obtained in polynomial time for the standard Bayesian problem is τ , the number of types, unless NP = P. Optimizing for the worst type is completely inapproximable in polynomial time, in the sense that we cannot distinguish instances where we can guarantee utility 1 from instances where it is impossible to guarantee positive utility, unless P=NP. We also studied a different representation of uncertainty about the follower's payoffs that relies on ranges, and showed that optimizing for the worst case is NP-hard in the basic setting, and completely inapproximable in a generalized setting where the payoffs are linked. These negative results provide some justification for the use of worst-case exponential-time algorithms in this context, such as those that use mixed integer programming.
Two immediate directions for future research are: (1) investigating the approximability of the basic ranges problem, and (2) considering the ranges problem in the Bayesian case (rather than the worst case). There are many other directions for future research, for example, studying the number of samples required to learn approximately optimal strategies, investigating the case where there are more than two players, and/or computing optimal Stackelberg strategies when the normal form has exponential size, but the game is concisely represented.
APPENDIX

A Omitted proofs from Section 3
Lemma 2. Given overestimates P a f and P a f on the regions corresponding to a f and a f , and points q a f and q a f in these respective regions, FIND POINT will either give a point on a new hyperplane for one of the regions P a f or P a f , or will return that P a f and P a f already have zero intersection volume. This requires at most O(L) samples.
Proof. If no interior point is found, then the intersection volume must be zero. Now consider the more interesting case when a point p * is found. Let a * f be the follower action produced by this point. There are three possibilities: either a * f = a f , a * f = a f , or a * f is not equal to either. Let us consider the first case, where a * f = a f . If we consider the line segment between p * and q a f , it is clear that this line segment will intersect with a currently unknown hyperplane for region a f . This is because we know that such a hyperplane exists, as a f is preferred at point q a f and it is not at point p * . We know that this hyperplane was previously unknown, because when we determined p * , we made sure that p * ∈ P a f . We can find the point of intersection with binary search, using O(L) samples. The same argument holds true for the other two cases, using the point q a f instead of q a f . We run FIND POINT on a f and a f . If it returns failure, we move on to the next pair of regions. If FIND POINT does find a point, we run DETERMINE HYPERPLANE to find a new hyperplane, after which we update the overestimates.
Theorem 1. To find, w.h.p., all the hyperplanes that separate regions, SU requires
Since we know that the d-simplex of all leader strategies is composed of at most k convex regions, there are at most k 2 separating hyperplanes (as each region can share at most one hyperplane with each other region). It takes O(L) samples per hyperplane to find a single point on it with FIND POINT, according to Lemma 2. It then takes an additional O(dL) samples to find d linearly independent points, according to Lemma 3. Thus, we require O(dL) samples per hyperplane, or O(k 2 dL) total samples to find all of the hyperplanes. This is in addition to the O(F k log k) samples necessary to find points in the regions with sufficiently high volume, according to Lemma 1.
Computationally, we need to run at most k 2 linear programs that find a valid starting point to determine a hyperplane, since there are at most k 2 hyperplanes. In addition, we need to run at most k 2 linear programs that fail to find a feasible point, because once we fail to find a feasible point we need never try that pair of follower actions again. This gives us a bound of O(k 2 ) on the number of linear programs.
B Multiple types/unknown payoffs
In this subsection, we extend the work of Section 3 to the Bayesian case, where there is a set Θ of opponent types (|Θ| = τ ), and the follower's payoff function remains unknown. First, let us consider a simplified version of this problem, where a sample tells us what every type would play for this mixed strategy, instead of what a single type would play. We call such a powerful sample a complete sample.
Lemma 4. The leader can find all the necessary hyperplanes using
Proof. Number the types θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ τ . We simply run the SU algorithm τ times, first for θ 1 , etc. In each case, we ignore all the information except for the type we are currently considering. In the end, we will know all the hyperplanes for each type. O(F k log(k) + dk 2 L)) samples are sufficient to solve the problem with a single type, which gives us the desired bound. Now let us consider the original problem where in a single sample, we only obtain a type θ drawn according to the distribution, and the action played by that type. We can use the algorithm from Lemma 4 by sampling the same point sufficiently often, so that we obtain a complete sample with all the types-in fact, we only need the type that the algorithm is currently considering.
Theorem 6. To find all of the hyperplanes requires
samples for a constant chance of success, where θ = argmin
Assume that we sample at each point (P (θ ) −1 ) * ln(zτ + 1) times. Since we fail a sample with probability (1 − P (θ )), we can upper bound the chance of failing (P (θ ) −1 ) * ln(zτ + 1) consecutive times as
. This gives a lower bound of (1 − 1 (zτ +1) ) chance of success at a single point. Then, our chance of succeeding at all zτ distinct points as
e . Thus we have a chance of success of greater than
Once we have all the hyperplanes, we have enough information to solve for the optimal strategy. To solve this exactly still requires us to solve an NP-hard problem, for example using the MIP from Appendix F.
C Known payoffs/unknown type distribution
In this subsection, we study a different version of the Stackelberg learning problem: we assume that the leader knows the payoff matrix for every follower type, but does not know the (fixed) distribution over types. In each round, the leader commits to a mixed strategy; the follower type is drawn according to the distribution over types; and finally, the follower plays his best response to the mixed strategy given his type. Unlike in Appendix B, the leader only learns the action that the follower plays, not the type. This will allow her to conclude that the follower's type must have been one of a subset of the types, but in general she will not know the type exactly, because multiple types may be consistent with the follower's action. If the leader learns the exact distribution over follower types, then of course she can compute the optimal strategy; however, she may also be able to learn the optimal strategy without learning the exact distribution over types. In fact, in some cases it is not possible to learn the exact distribution-for example, if there are two types for which the optimal response to any leader strategy is column 1. The leader's goal is to learn the optimal strategy in as few rounds as possible. We try to minimize the worst-case number of rounds required.
First, we assume that the distribution is degenerate: the follower always has the same type θ, but the leader initially does not know which one. We obtain the following simple result:
Proposition 1
If the follower has a fixed type θ, then the leader can learn an optimal Stackelberg strategy in τ rounds. Computationally, this requires only polynomial time.
Proof. Let σ θ be an optimal Stackelberg strategy for the leader if the follower type is θ (which can be computed in polynomial time using linear programming). If θ 1 , . . . , θ τ is an ordering of the types, then in round i, let the leader commit to σ θi . In round i, the leader obtains some utility U i l . Let i * ∈ arg max i∈{1,...,τ } U i l be a round in which the leader obtained maximal utility. Then, σ θ i * is an optimal Stackelberg strategy. This is because in the round i such that θ i = θ (the true follower type), the leader will obtain the maximum possible utility.
We now move on to the case of an arbitrary (fixed) distribution over types. Any given leader strategy will result in a distribution over follower actions: given leader strategy σ, the probability that follower action a f is played is P (a f |σ) = θ∈Θ x θ,σ,a f where x θ,σ,a f is 1 if a follower of type θ would respond to σ with action a f , and 0 otherwise. If the leader commits to the same mixed strategy σ for a sufficiently large number of rounds, the leader will (approximately) learn P (a f |σ) for all a f . (In practice, it may also be desirable not to have to switch strategies too often.) We assume that the leader learns in this manner, that is, by using the same mixed strategy for sufficiently long to learn the P (a f |σ) before switching to another mixed strategy. We call such a period in which the leader only plays a single mixed strategy an extended sample. Our objective is to minimize the number of extended samples needed to learn the optimal strategy.
Theorem 7.
If the follower types are drawn independently from a fixed distribution, the leader can learn enough about the distribution to determine an optimal Stackelberg strategy using 2τ extended samples. Computationally, this requires polynomial time.
